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ABSTRACT 
Research has identified institutional shareholders and shareholders’ associations as separate 
groups that are able to interact and promote accountability through shareholder activism. This 
study employs a qualitative methodology to critically evaluate how institutional shareholders 
perceive the participation of Nigerian shareholders’ associations in shareholder activism. We 
examine three features of accountability that are vital in shareholder activism; dialectical 
activity, independence and agenda. We contribute to the accountability literature by showing 
how these three features shape institutional shareholders’ perception of shareholders’ 
associations as shareholder activists. Our findings show distinct differences between the 
views of representatives from active and passive institutional shareholders.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with shareholder activism in Nigeria. According to Sjöström (2008: 
p.142), shareholder activism is “the use of ownership position to actively influence company 
policy and practice”. More specifically, our paper explores the perceived value of 
shareholders’ associations’ engagement in shareholder activism. Shareholders’ associations 
are a registered group consisting largely of small individual shareholders.1 We know from 
prior literature on developed countries that shareholders’ associations have benefited from 
institutional shareholders’ collaborative participation in shareholder activism. Shareholders’ 
associations engaged in shareholder activism have recorded successful campaigns with the 
help of institutional shareholders that use their proxy votes to support shareholder proposals 
(Gillan and Starks, 2000; Strickland et al, 1996). However, there is little empirical work in 
either developed or developing setting which explores whether institutional shareholders 
value shareholders’ associations’ participation in shareholder activism. It is not clear whether 
activist work by shareholders’ associations’ is perceived in a positive light by institutional 
shareholders. Therefore, we lack an understanding of the effect of participation by 
shareholders’ associations in shareholder activism on institutional shareholders. 
 
This study aims to bring more clarity to this issue by investigating the context of Nigeria, a 
developing country setting. Nigeria offers a unique and relevant context to explore the extent 
to which shareholders’ associations participation in shareholder activism is deemed in a 
positive light by institutional shareholders. Firstly, the Nigerian setting is unique as it hosts 
over thirty shareholders’ associations compared to other countries where there is usually only 
one shareholders’ association participating in shareholder activism (Adegbite et al, 2012; 
Amao and Amaeshi, 2008; Carrington and Johed, 2007; Manry and Stangeland, 2003; 
Poulsen et al, 2010). Secondly, this setting is relevant because of the similarities in the pattern 
of shareholders’ associations’ membership compared to some developed countries. In 
Nigeria, the membership of shareholders’ associations consists of only small individual 
investors. This arrangement is similar to countries like New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden 
and the UK (Bailey, 2005; Catasús and Johed, 2007; Hasenfuss, 2006; Morrall, 2011). This 
feature is key in understanding the strategies employed, and the nature of shareholder 
influence over corporate managers in shareholder activism.  
 
This study intends critically to evaluate how active and passive institutional shareholders 
perceive the value of shareholders’ associations’ participation in shareholder activism. In our 
interview results, where feasible, we make a distinction between the views of representatives 
from active and passive institutional shareholders. This is because prior research has already 
established that institutional shareholders adopt different approaches towards shareholder 
activism. The different approaches enable institutional shareholders to benefit in different 
ways from the actions of other activists. For example, active institutional shareholders have 
benefited from co-ordinated voting with other institutional shareholders. However, passive 
institutional shareholders avoid direct participation in campaigns led by other activists. 
However, they benefit from the efforts of other institutional shareholder engaged in activism 
thereby free-riding (Brav et al, 2008; Norli, et al, 2015; Poulsen et al, 2010). Our results are 
analysed using accountability theory rather than the traditional dominant theoretical 
framework of agency theory. Agency theory directs our attention to agency problem in 
understanding the rationale for shareholder engagement in shareholder activism (Goranova 
and Ryan, 2014; Yakasai, 2001; Yuan et al, 2009). However, this theory is limited in its 
capture of the behavioural dynamics associated with the process of shareholder activism.  
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On the other hand, accountability theory provides a different dimension by focusing on the 
how agents behave in relation to management (see Roberts et al, 2005). More importantly, 
this theory assumes that in giving an account, there is an expectation of dialectical activity 
between the independent bodies: the accountor and accountee (Mulgan, 2000). This paper 
shares the view that shareholder activism is a form of accountability mechanism that requires 
institutional shareholders to step into an accountor-accountee relationship and demand 
accounts from management. In a corporate accountability process, the accountees are able to 
exert influence by challenging and/or supporting the accountor’s decision on accounts 
relating to corporate practices and policies (see Roberts et al, 2005). This process of 
accountability has been observed in the relations between shareholders and management. 
Scholars report that management (accountors) are influenced through dialogue on corporate 
strategic decisions and performance by institutional shareholders (accountees) (Solomon and 
Darby, 2005; Roberts et al, 2006; Yuan et al, 2009). Interestingly, while these studies 
acknowledge the notion of accountability in shareholder-management relations, they do not 
use accountability theory in theorisation. Instead, the few researchers that have employed this 
theory concentrate largely on the study of stakeholder activism (Laufer, 2003; O’Connell et 
al, 2005). Our study employs accountability theory to study shareholder activism.  
 
Overall, this study makes a theoretical contribution to both the accountability and shareholder 
literature by deploying accountability theory in the study of shareholder activism. The 
explicit adoption of accountability theory has been largely omitted in prior research on 
shareholder activism (Brav et al, 2008; Goranova, and Ryan, 2014; Marler and Faugère, 
2010; Norli, 2015). We explore three areas of accountability that have implications for 
shareholder activism: dialectical activity, independence and agenda. Second, this study makes 
an empirical contribution to the study on institutional shareholder activism by highlighting, 
where feasible, the difference between the views of representatives from active and passive 
institutional shareholders in relation to shareholders’ associations’ participation in 
shareholder activism. The findings highlight the difference in perceptions of representatives 
from active and passive institutional shareholders on shareholders’ associations’ participation 
in shareholder activism. Third, our study contributes to the literature by addressing the role of 
shareholders’ associations in shareholder activism (Johed and Catasús, 2015; Strickland et al, 
1996; Uche and Atkins, 2015). However, it provides a different perspective by largely 
exploring and emphasising the view of institutional shareholders. The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows: the next sections are the literature review and theoretical background. 
This is followed by a review of the context and the research method. Next, we discuss our 
empirical evidence and present our conclusion.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
2.1 Institutional shareholders and Shareholders’ associations as a participants in 
shareholder activism  
Academic studies show that both institutional and non-institutional shareholders play a key 
role in shareholder activism. Studies report that active institutional shareholders include 
pension funds, mutual funds and hedge funds with banks and  insurance companies (Becht et 
al, 2008; Brav et al, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009, Hendry et al, 2007; Song and. Szewczyk, 
2003). A few of these studies have documented evidence of pension funds and hedge funds 
working in concert when targeting similar companies within their portfolio (Brav et al, 2008; 
Klein and Zur, 2009, Poulsen et al, 2010). They suggest that joint campaigns between 
different or similar institutional shareholders for example, hedge funds have produced more 
positive outcomes. This has led some authors to attribute success in shareholder activism to 
such relationships (Brav et al, 2008; Strickland et al, 1996). However, studies have also 
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revealed that some institutional shareholders are passive towards shareholder activism. 
Institutional shareholders may be unwilling to engage in shareholder activism because of 
short-termism, threat to business reputation, and governance costs (Partnoy and Thomas, 
2007; Romano, 2001; Ryan and Schneider, 2002).  
 
Non-institutional shareholders can be categorised into small individual shareholders in the 
form of shareholders’ associations and large individual shareholders (Poulsen et al, 2010; 
Crespi and Renneboog, 2010; Song and Szewczyk, 2003). The difference between small and 
large individual shareholders is attributable to the size of their shareholdings which 
influences their approach to, and effectiveness of, shareholder activism (Connell et al, 2010; 
Crespi and Renneboog, 2010; Johnson et al, 2010). Small individual shareholders on their 
own face the disadvantage of having a weak influence over management because of their 
small voting rights. To overcome these constraints, small shareholders may temporarily 
increase the power of their votes by combining their votes with other shareholders when 
engaging in shareholder activism. Thus, coordination mitigates the need for large block 
holding. These small individual shareholders are able to co-ordinate their activities through 
organisations such as shareholders’ associations. While they do not have a similar 
information advantage as the large individual shareholders, particularly insiders, small 
shareholders are able to influence corporate strategies and board nominations (Poulsen et al, 
2010; Strickland et al, 1996). Strickland et al (1996) finds that the coordination between a 
shareholders’ association and institutional shareholders has been beneficial in driving 
successful shareholder-initiated proposals in the USA. Institutional shareholders have voted 
in support of shareholder proposals sponsored by a shareholders’ association.  
 
2.2 Theoretical framework: Accountability and shareholder activism  
This study employs accountability theory in the study of shareholder activism. It examines 
three areas of accountability that have implications for shareholder activism.  The areas are 
(a) accountability as a dialectical activity (b) Independence in the accountor-accountee 
relationship and (c) conflicting agendas in accountability.  
 
Accountability and Dialectical activity 
Mulgan (2002) argues that accountability is seen as a dialectical activity. From this 
standpoint, accountability is considered to be an activity that requires the accountee to engage 
in “questioning, assessing and criticising” when holding the accountor to account (Mulgan, 
2000, p. 569). The accountability process take the form of an open discussion and debate 
between the accountor and accountee. While the author, Mulgan (2000) did not directly 
explore the corporate environment, such behaviour have been confirmed as reflective of the 
accountability relationship between board members and management in corporate 
governance. Roberts et al (2005) identified a range of behaviours linked to accountability. 
They observe that “questioning, probing, discussing, informing and encouraging” were used 
by board members to hold management to account (Roberts et al, 2005, p.s6).  
 
Prior research has found that shareholder activism displays similar behavioural features. 
Institutional shareholders and shareholders’ associations openly question, discuss and 
negotiate with management on strategic decisions at private meetings (Solomon and Darby, 
2005; Roberts et al, 2006. Dialogues as a way of engagement with managers is particularly 
favoured by pension funds (Becht et al, 2008; Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Norli, et al, 2015, 
Poulsen et al, 2010; Strickland et al, 1996). Solomon and Darby (2005) find that companies 
gain from their dialogue with institutional shareholders on social, ethical and environmental 
issues (SEEs). The SEEs process helps to inform corporate disclosures aimed at the public. 
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However, importantly, the literature also suggests that shareholders’ associations frequently 
use non-dialectical approaches such as protestation, media publicity campaigns and other 
confrontational tactics to hold management to account at AGMs forums (Amao and Amaeshi, 
2008; Johed and Catasús, 2015).  
 
Independence in the accountor-accountee relationship  
Ryan and Schneider (2002) argue that in shareholder activism, the shareholder expects to 
exert a level of influence on the strategic outcome of the managerial decision in a company 
within their portfolio. Influence is easier where there is a level of independence between the 
activist and the management of the target company. This implicit assumption is observed in 
the analysis of the relationship between institutional shareholders and management in the 
study of shareholder activism (Becht et al, 2008; Crespi and Renneboog, 2010; Ingley and 
Van der Walt, 2001; Catasús and Johed, 2007; Johed and Catasús, 2015). Poulsen et al (2010) 
notes that in the Swedish corporate governance system, the small shareholders linked to 
shareholders’ associations are able to have a voice independent of the board due to the 
corporate governance structure. This independent relationship allows shareholders to co-
operate and increase their influence over management.  
 
Research studies suggest that pressure-sensitive institutional shareholders lack independence 
from management. These type of investors prefer to protect their business interests or 
relationship by deferring to the preferences of management. Such behaviour is usually 
associated with passive institutional shareholders rather than active institutional shareholders 
(Almazan et al, 2005; Brickley et al, 1988; Marler and Faugère, 2010). Stratling (2012) 
argues that such a business relationship is absent in the dynamics between shareholders’ 
associations and management. Therefore, shareholders’ associations do not face similar 
problems. However, some studies report that financial benefits obtained outside business 
relationship may hamper independence between the accountor-accountee. They argue that 
shareholders’ associations in Nigeria develop a cosy relationship with management when 
they receive personal financial incentives (Adegbite et al, 2012: Yakasai, 2001). The lack of 
independence between these shareholders and management prevents the former from holding 
the latter to account. 
 
Conflicting agendas in accountability  
At the centre of the accountability process are the agendas tabled by institutional 
shareholders. The agendas cover financial and non-financial issues. The popular issues range 
from financial performance, corporate governance, social, environmental to human rights 
issues (Crespi and Renneboog, 2010; McLaren, 2004; Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Solomon 
and Darby, 2005). While the agendas pursued by different shareholder groups might overlap, 
researchers point out that their interests and time horizons tend to differ (Goranova and Ryan, 
2014; Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001). They suggest that institutional shareholders such as 
pension funds invest sizable stakes over a long-term period in comparison with smaller 
individual shareholders who invest smaller stakes over a short-term period. They argue that 
this difference in interest and time horizon generates conflict between the different 
shareholder groups. For example, Stratling (2012) notes that hedge funds are short-term 
oriented. Hedge funds have a stronger preference for short-term pay-outs. She points out that 
such actions has drawn criticism for shareholders’ associations in Germany.  
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3. THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT 
The prior literature suggest that institutional shareholders in Nigeria play a less prominent 
public role in shareholder activism compared to shareholders’ associations, although the 
effectiveness of the latter has been questioned (Amao and Amaeshi, 2008; Okike, 2007; 
Yakasai, 2001). It has been reported that shareholders’ associations through shareholder 
activism have resisted the fraudulent sale of corporate assets and played a role in sacking 
poorly performing corporate executives (Aderinokun, 2003; Chigbo, 2000). However, both 
shareholder groups are deemed to be important players in the implementation of corporate 
governance reforms. For instance, the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
have openly encouraged institutional shareholders and organised shareholders’ groups to take 
on a more active role in shareholder activism to help improve practices (SEC Code, 2003). 
This code was revised in 2011. The non-mandatory SEC Code (2003) encourages 
institutional shareholder activism. Section 10 (a) states:  
 
“The company or board should not discourage shareholder activism whether by 
institutional shareholders or by organised shareholders’ groups. Shareholders 
with large holdings (institutional and non-institutional) should act and influence 
the standard of corporate governance positively and thereby optimise stakeholder 
value”.  
 
The SEC Code (2011) specifically requires “institutional shareholders and other shareholders 
with large holdings to seek to positively influence the standard of corporate governance in the 
companies in which they invest”. Institutional shareholders are expected to demand 
compliance and explanations for non-compliance. It is argued that while institutional 
shareholders are not there to usurp the role of monitoring agencies, they can pressurise 
companies to take shareholder accountability and interests more seriously (Chung and 
Talaulicar, 2010; Roberts et al, 2006). Roberts et al (2005; 2006) find that the demand for 
accountability by institutional shareholders, allows for better dialogue with corporate 
managers on matters that are intended to create better shareholder value. In Nigeria, 
institutional shareholders have an opportunity to pursue better governance practices given 
their previous public silence in the face of scandals, governance and accountability problems 
(Bakre, 2007; Ahunwan, 2002; CBN, 2006). Yakasai (2001) argues that institutional 
shareholders are in a better strategic position than small shareholders to engage with 
corporate managers. This group of investors is able to influence board nominations and 
bridge the communication gap with shareholders, and consequently play a crucial role in 
improving corporate governance practices, through dialogue with management (Ajogwu, 
2007).  
 
4. RESEARCH METHODS 
Given the evolutionary state of shareholder activism in Nigeria, this study used qualitative 
research to provide necessary insights. We used interviews because this allowed us to capture 
insights into events associated with shareholder activism through the personal account of 
individuals’ experiences (Hendry et al., 2007; Useem et al., 1993). Our data is drawn from 
two stages of in-depth interviews. Nineteen institutional shareholders were involved in the 
first stage of the interviews. The sample in the second stage included three institutional 
shareholders; two representatives of a shareholders’ association and two representatives from 
regulatory bodies. Interview respondents included mainly high profile/senior managers of 
large asset management companies, pension funds, securities houses, an executive of a 
shareholder association, as well as representatives from the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission and Corporate Affairs Commission in Nigeria. Some information about the data 
respondents are provided in Table 1.  
 
The interview respondents were key stakeholders in the Nigerian institutional shareholder 
activism system. This research thus benefited from their insider views on shareholder 
activism. The first round of interviews were conducted in the last quarter of 2008 at Lagos 
and Port Harcourt, both of which are major financial cities in Nigeria (following a pilot 
interview in March 2008). The second round of interviews was conducted in the second and 
last quarter of 2012. This involved a mix of both telephone and face to face interviews. This 
helped us to validate claims from prior interviews and gather further evidence on the themes 
that had emerged from the first round of interviews. For both stages, the face-to-face 
interviews were conducted at the corporate offices of the interviewees. The interviewees were 
given a form to complete to capture their demographic details and relevant information about 
their institutions. The interviews lasted from between 30mins and an hour. The interviewees 
were encouraged to speak freely.  
 
The interviewees were promised anonymity, therefore, numerical codes have been used to 
conceal their identity. B1 – B23 for shareholders and R1 and R2 for regulators. The words 
‘active’ or ‘passive’ is indicated besides the codes to highlight the stance of a financial 
institution or shareholders’ association towards shareholder activism. We have chosen to use 
only a few extracts from the interview with regulators where it is deemed appropriate. We 
have also drawn interview data from a separate study that explores shareholders’ 
associations’ participation in shareholder activism. Fourteen shareholders’ associations were 
represented in the sample. The data from the interviews with representatives of the various 
shareholders’ associations were used primarily to validate the findings from the interviews 
with the institutional shareholders. This is because the focus of our analysis is institutional 
shareholders’ perceptions of shareholders’ associations. For the interviews with institutional 
shareholders, a formal set of questions was followed. Questions also evolved during the 
interview process. Interviews were tape recorded and the data was later transcribed. Hand-
written notes were used to support the data gathering process.  
 
The interviewees were asked to comment on different aspects relating to institutional 
shareholder activism, including the concept, its existence in Nigeria, their engagement in 
shareholder activism, the impediments/challenges they faced, and their relationship with 
shareholders’ associations. The respondents were asked whether their financial institution 
adopted a passive or an active approach toward institutional shareholder activism. Certain 
themes emerged around the nature of shareholder activism from the interview questions and 
the transcribed text. A coding scheme was thereafter developed around these themes. This is 
highlighted in the empirical section. The interviews provided insights into the experiences 
and issues associated with institutional shareholders, shareholders’ associations and 
regulators. Nonetheless, interviews are prone to subjectivity and bias, as interviewees may 
fail fully to recount stories and may emphasise selected bits of their experience (Shotter and 
Gergen, 1994). This paper recognises this potential bias through an acknowledgement of 
areas of disagreement and consensus. Also, to add further validity to the research, findings in 
this research were corroborated after the interview: checks were made using documentary 
evidence from the public domain in the form of prospectuses and newspaper reports. 
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5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The interviews revealed that only a few institutional shareholders participated in shareholder 
activism in Nigeria. The few active institutional shareholders identified during the interviews 
were private pension funds and asset management companies. The field was dominated by 
three out of the top five private pension funds ranked by asset size in Table 2. In Nigeria, the 
top three pension fund administrators controlled 46% while the top five controlled over 61%, 
of the pension market share as at 2011. The top three Pension fund assets (PFAs) are almost 
forty times the size of the bottom ten in terms of Pension assets (Pencom, first quarter report, 
2010). This moves power to the domain of a few PFAs. These size differential is interesting 
because it suggests that the few large PFAs had the flexibility of working independently as 
activists or strategically cooperating with other groups. This section concentrates on 
institutional shareholders’ perceptions of the shareholders’ association engagement in 
shareholder activism in Nigeria. The findings suggest that there were cases of marked 
differences in opinion between the representatives of institutions adopting an active or 
passive approach to shareholder activism.  
 
Accountability and [Non] Dialectical activity  
The process of accountability as described in the literature involves dialectical activity. 
Dialectical activity represents a process of engagement where the accountee (shareholders’ 
association) is involved in questioning, probing, discussing and criticising the accountor 
(management) in an accountability relationship (Mulgan, 2000, Roberts et al, 2005). The 
findings suggest that institutional shareholders did not view shareholders’ associations as 
keen on using dialectical activities in shareholder activism when holding management to 
account. Shareholders’ associations approach to engagement with management was 
dominated by non-dialectical activities. The use of this strategic approach to shareholder 
activism was recognised by both representatives of active and passive institutional 
shareholders. However, both types of institutional shareholders had different views on the 
preference for non-dialectical approaches by shareholders’ associations. The respondents 
representing passive institutional shareholders presented shareholders’ associations’ non-
dialectical approach in a positive tone as seen in the excerpts below. 
 
“They [shareholders’ associations] call their meetings and start to address the 
press on issues that actually border on their investments’ return... They are ready 
to go to court sometimes to drive home their point... they are very potent” [B19-
Passive] 
 
“In situations where individual shareholders or an association of shareholders are 
aggrieved, they go to AGMs where they have the power to change the board and 
to change policies. They ensure that they get to the AGM venue and if they are 
not allowed in, they block the entrance of the AGM, thus attracting [media] 
attention. They make noise to attract people’s attention. They go to the press and 
embarrass the company and call on the company to discuss with them in order 
that they are able to air their views….” [B11-Passive] 
 
The respondents representing passive institutional shareholders were, however, supportive of 
the non-dialectical approach adopted by shareholders’ associations. They explained that the 
presence of shareholders’ associations in the corporate space was beneficial because it meant 
that some institutional shareholders could afford to sit on the side lines. “A lot of institutional 
investors do not engage in activism; they allow individuals and associations to fight their 
cause” [B12-Passive]. The general perception was that shareholders’ associations’ 
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engagement was beneficial to the interest of passive institutional shareholders. As a 
respondent notes, “they are the ones making noise but they are protecting our interest too... 
there is no regulation curtailing them, or restricting them from going to the media to accuse 
managers of expropriation and fraud” [B13-Passive]. This interpretation of the behaviour of 
shareholders’ associations by representatives of small passive institutional shareholders was 
different from those of the larger active institutional shareholders. The latter described the 
tactics of shareholders’ associations as noisemaking or unionism. The description appeared to 
be framed in a negative light.  
 
“They come together and make sure they make so much noise at AGM.” [B20-
Active] 
 
“Most activism lies at the level of individual shareholder activism that runs in a 
way that is not too dissimilar to how unions are formed. Some of the tactics 
(referring to shareholder activism by shareholders’ associations in Nigeria) are 
not too far from the Japanese ones where they rely on public 
embarrassment....They have a practice which is akin to unionism in Nigeria. It is 
not obvious to me a lot of the times that some of the things shareholders are 
pushing for are in the best interest of the company and themselves.” [B3-Active] 
 
The excerpts above suggest that the confrontational tactics reported to have been used by 
shareholders’ associations were quite different from the tactic preferred by active institutional 
shareholders. The strategic emphasis on non-dialectical activity was considered problematic 
by respondents from active institutional shareholders. One possible explanation is that 
dialogues held privately with management are highly favoured by institutional shareholders 
particularly pension funds. They were deemed to be a more powerful option (Becht et al, 
2008; Goranova and Ryan, 2014). Goranova and Ryan (2014) describe this approach as 
synonymous with private activism where activities linked to shareholder activism are 
typically unobservable by researchers.  
 
Independence in the accountor-accountee relationship  
The issue of independence between shareholders’ associations and management was 
addressed by only one respondent from an institution that was deemed to adopt a passive 
approach to shareholder activism. However, the responses from representatives of active 
institutional shareholder suggest that shareholders’ associations were seen as being 
influenced by management. They accused shareholders’ associations’ of forming alliance, 
and praising management in return for perks. In one of the interviews, a respondent 
representing an active institutional shareholders recounted an incident in which he felt that 
some shareholders’ associations were influenced by, and colluded with, management. 
 
“During the banking consolidation in December 2005, I was at a shareholders’ 
meeting to discuss a potential merger and acquisition bid for Bank 'A’, which we 
believe was not in the company’s interest...When we got to the meeting, the 
president of shareholders’ association [Y] in Nigeria, “I am sure that he had 
colluded with management and was already influenced”. He stood up and said 
that we have to give in and join the alliance; some people were like 'No! No! No! 
No!' and before we knew what was happening, members of the shareholders’ 
associations all voted in support of the agenda. They counted their votes and it 
was all over” [B8-Active] 
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Respondent [B8- Active] described the shock he experienced concerning the non-transparent 
manner in which shareholders’ associations agreed to management’s plan to merge with 
another bank without a thorough consultation process. He argued like some other respondents 
that shareholders’ obtained personal benefits because of their support of management. For 
example, [B20-Active], uses the word “settle” which is a Nigerian slang for paying off 
(bribing) a party. 
 
 “Unfortunately, these shareholders’ associations’ activities have been abused. 
…The management of companies know they are going to give a lot of trouble and 
since they are in Nigeria, they know that they are going to settle them outside. 
Those people, their shareholder activism is for their personally gain and not for 
the collective interest of investors.”[B20-Active] 
 
A respondent representing a passive institutional shareholder made an accusation against 
shareholders’ associations. He reported that they, 
 
“Long to get personal favours when they go for board meeting. They get the 
company to pay for their transport to the AGM and their hotel bills where they 
lodge. In some stances, some are given directorship or their relative to 
compensate them. They compromise their independence.” [B24-Passive]  
 
The findings suggest that active institutional shareholders viewed personal gains as a factor 
hampering shareholders’ associations from criticising and questioning management at AGMs. 
Interviewees believed that consistent ‘praise singers’, ‘story tellers’(i.e. focusing on the trivial 
and irrelevant) and supporters of management at AGMs were culprits in this process. Some 
shareholders became cautious in their criticism of management in a bid to gain financial 
favour and thus raise funds from the corporations that they were supposed to monitor.  
 
“….there are those of them that are professional praise singers because of what 
they want to get or what they have received” (B25). 
 
“………a lot of people come to the floor to tell stories instead of talking about the 
accounts…[For example, ] I met your father fifteen years ago - that has nothing to 
do with what is written in the accounts”. (B26)  
 
The findings suggest that there was a lack of independence between some shareholders’ 
associations and management. This contrasts with the assumption of prior literature where 
activist groups are deemed to act independently in pursuit of accountability (Becht et al, 
2008; Crespi and Renneboog, 2010; Johed and Catasús, 2015; Poulsen et al, 2010). The study 
finds that comments from the respondents and the media suggested that some representatives 
of shareholders’ associations may have been influenced through gifts and perks to support the 
interests of management. There have been occasional accusations of collusions between 
representatives of shareholders’ associations and management of companies. For example, a 
media house quotes a chairman of a shareholders’ association as stating that,  
 
“I have attended meetings where companies gave gift items and there have been 
situations where they gave cash for transport, which I count as mutual 
understanding between the company and the shareholders. It is not all companies 
which call for pre-AGMs that give gifts, it is all about understanding each other” 
(February 11, Vanguard, 2014) 
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The influence of corporate managers over some shareholders’ associations was also observed 
by the regulators. This was attributed to monetary sponsorship. “Some of them are taken over 
by company management, and are sponsored...” [R1]. Another regulator argues that 
shareholders’ associations are failing in their duties to enforce good governance in companies 
through their membership of audit committees, “...For example, looking at the requirements 
of the audit committee... They can require investigation into the internal and external audit. 
But most of them don’t do this….We know the companies are sponsoring them and using 
them to evade compliance with some regulatory provisions” [R2]. This problem of influence 
has been raised in an academic paper by Adegbite et al (2012, p. 397). The authors note that 
“executive members of many of the shareholder associations now maintain close and 
personal relationships with the executives of the firms they are meant to check.” In sum, the 
shareholders’ associations appeared to have earned a poor reputation amongst some 
respondents representing active institutional shareholders and regulators. The representatives 
of the active institutional shareholders viewed the lack of independence between 
shareholders’ associations and management as obstructive to genuine engagement in 
shareholder activism. 
 
Conflicting agenda in accountability  
The findings suggest that representatives from active institutional shareholders perceived a 
conflict between their agenda and the agenda promoted by shareholders’ associations. 
Respondents representing active institutional shareholders were of the opinion that 
shareholders’ associations focused more on short term benefits like dividends rather than long 
term benefits that emphasised corporate survival. This is confirmed by a representative of the 
regulatory institution that noted, that “the main attraction is dividends; they are not interested 
in even the company remaining a ‘going concern’…” [R2]. A representative from the passive 
institutional shareholders points out that shareholders’ associations ask about dividend 
payment, “if they are not going to pay a dividend?”, The companies are asked “why they are 
not paying dividend or if they [the company] are supposed to give out bonus, and say ‘no’, 
the shareholders’ associations will ask why?” [B10-Passive]. He was emphatic in stating that 
the companies respond to shareholder’ associations’ pressure, “Yes….They do consider 
shareholders’ concerns. The interest of shareholders’ associations appeared to be consistent 
with that of passive institutional shareholders. Comments from representatives of passive 
institutional shareholders indicated their institution was largely interested in dividend 
payouts.  For example, a respondent noted, 
 
They [passive institutional shareholders] are looking at the return on their 
investment that is what is key to them any other thing is secondary. They want to 
ensure that they are getting their dividend and the company is making profit [B4-
Passive] 
 
Representatives of the active institutional shareholders noted that the problem they had with 
shareholders’ associations demand for dividend payment was its effect on the long-term 
prospects of the target company. They viewed the demand for immediate dividend payment 
(a short term goal) as conflicting with their support for the company’s long-term goals (for 
example, investment). 
 
 “We have to deal with them often, in a case where sometimes we are large 
holders in companies...It may be that the company which has great growth 
prospects may needs to retain the cash to drive those growth prospects. It is very 
12 
 
difficult to explain something like that and gain cooperation from shareholder 
associations because they want more immediate gratification in terms of 
dividends upfront and so on…. In term of activism, we find it easier to identify 
sizable shareholders; institutions or individual shareholders, and go and deal with 
them” [B3- Active].  
 
“What you find is that they keep clamouring for dividend payment. They want 
bonuses and they might not want to understand from the company’s perspective. 
If for example, the company is undergoing restructuring, investing in new 
projects, the shareholders’ associations would only think about payment of 
dividend, irrespective of anything that might be happening. Institutional 
shareholders’ do not take that sort of position. They take a more informed 
position.” [B20- Active]. 
 
These quotes show that the representatives of active institutional shareholders considered the 
shareholders’ associations’ demand for dividend payment as sometimes detrimental to the 
corporate objectives. They were unhappy with situations where shareholders’ associations 
were more interested in a target company using its cash for dividend payment instead of for 
strategic investments. One respondent representing an active institutional shareholder warned 
that shareholders’ associations, “need to be educated, they should not be interested in their 
dividend and bonus alone they should come up and really see themselves as part owners of 
the company [B18-Active]. In sum, the members of the top five large pension funds were not 
enthusiastic about co-operating with shareholders’ associations because of the latter’s attitude 
towards dividend payments which appeared to be driven by self-interest. This approach had 
not gone unnoticed by the shareholders’ associations. A representative of a shareholders’ 
association pointed out that cooperating with one of these top financial institutions is 
challenging because of the communication barriers instituted by their executive director. 
 
Any communication is only by phone…Anything he wants to do is by proxy 
because he represents a majority investor…He does not discuss with small 
shareholders. He is not supportive of small shareholders’ associations…. [B22-
Active] 
 
In prior literature, scholars argue that shareholder groups use shareholder activism to promote 
their agenda (Crespi and Renneboog, 2010; Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001). In this case, the 
time horizon on returns was an important source of conflict between shareholder groups. The 
pursuits of short term objectives by shareholders’ associations was reported as conflicting 
with the interest of active institutional shareholders. In general, our findings suggest that 
representatives from the active institutional shareholders were not complimentary about the 
work of shareholders’ associations. Their views can be summed up in this quote by a 
respondent from the group; “shareholders’ association have not been effective in promoting 
corporate governance.” [B23-Active]. Our findings suggest that institutional shareholders had 
given consideration to shareholders’ associations’ participation in shareholder activism.  
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our study critically evaluated how active and passive institutional shareholders perceive 
shareholders’ associations’ participation in shareholder activism. The findings revealed that 
shareholders’ associations de-emphasised dialogue in their interaction with management. 
This contrasts with the dialectical approach preferred by active institutional shareholders who 
have the advantage of large shareholdings. It could be argued that given members of 
shareholders’ associations hold small equity in companies, they are forced into an unequal 
relationship (Poulson et al, 2010). The passive institutional shareholders face a similar 
challenge. This might explain why the respondents representing passive institutional 
shareholders did not express any form of displeasure regarding shareholders’ associations’ 
preference for coercive force to pressure management at public forums. Instead, it drew their 
support. On the other hand, the representatives of active institutional shareholders did not 
appreciate the non-dialectical approach used by shareholders’ associations. They viewed the 
shareholder’ associations’ approach as a form of noisemaking that was really not as effective 
as the active institutional shareholders’ preferred approach which is dialogue with 
management. The findings suggest that the decision to use mainly dialogue to enforce 
accountability might shape an activist appreciation of the work of another activist group.  
 
Another important finding is that most of the respondents from passive institutional 
shareholders failed to mention the problem of independence in the accountor-accountee 
relationship between shareholders’ associations and management. On the other hand, the 
respondents representing active institutional shareholders viewed the accountor-accountee 
relationship between shareholders’ associations and management as lacking independence. 
The respondents attributed the lack of independence in their relationship as well as 
shareholder sensitivity to management to the desire of shareholders’ associations’ members 
for personal gains from management. Their observations were collaborated by interviews 
with representatives from the regulatory sector. Thus, our findings shed new light on how 
active institutional shareholders might perceive the actions of shareholders’ associations that 
are deemed to be pressure-sensitive. It highlights the issue of pressure-sensitivity among 
shareholders’ associations, a different category of shareholders that seek to promote their 
personal interests. This differs from prior studies that focus on the lack of independence by 
pressure-sensitive institutional shareholders (Almazan et al, 2005; Brickley et al, 1988; 
Marler and Faugère, 2010).  
 
Prior literature shows that shareholders engaged in shareholder activism have a defined set of 
agenda (Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Stratling, 2012). Our findings 
supports this idea. However, it builds on this idea by uncovering potential conflict between 
shareholders’ associations and active institutional shareholders in the study of shareholder 
activism. Thus, the third findings suggest that representatives from active institutional 
shareholders view their agenda as conflicting with that of shareholders’ associations. 
However, the agenda of the latter was not reported as conflicting with that of passive 
institutional shareholders. In this vein, our findings draw attention to the need for future 
research to explore the strategic implications of such conflicting agenda that are linked to 
differences in shareholder expectations. However, it is vital to point out that differences in 
shareholder expectations are not easily captured in research that separately addresses the 
work of shareholders’ associations or active institutional shareholders as demonstrated in 
prior studies (Becht et al, 2008; Brav et al, 2008; Johed and Catasús, 2015; Strickland et al, 
1996) 
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The study makes a theoretical contribution to both the accountability and shareholder 
literature by deploying accountability theory in the study of shareholder activism. The 
explicit adoption of accountability theory has been largely omitted in prior research on 
shareholder activism (Brav et al, 2008; Goranova, and Ryan, 2014; Marler and Faugère, 
2010; Norli, 2015). This study provides empirical support of the usefulness of an 
accountability perspective in the study of shareholder activism. To achieve this, we develop a 
simple theoretical framework that allows us employ the theory of accountability in the study 
of shareholder activism. In this paper, we explore three areas of accountability that have 
implications for shareholder activism; dialectical activity, independence and agenda. The 
focus on these three key areas allow us capture the richness in the data analysis which is 
otherwise difficult to capture by solely adopting agency theory. Moreover, our findings 
illustrate how accountability practices are implicated in shareholder activism in the context of 
Nigeria. 
 
Second, this study makes an empirical contribution to the study on institutional shareholder 
activism by highlighting the difference between the views of representatives from active and 
passive institutional shareholders in relation to shareholders’ associations’ participation in 
shareholder activism. The findings highlight the difference in the perceptions of 
representatives from active and passive institutional shareholders of shareholders’ 
associations’ participation in shareholder activism. We know from past research that 
shareholders’ associations may form a temporary strategic alliance with institutional 
shareholders to enhance their activist campaigns (Strickland et al, 1996). Our findings add to 
this prior research by explaining why active institutional shareholders may decide to avoid 
strategic collaborations with shareholders’ associations in shareholder activism. We show 
that the perceived non-dialectical approach to activism, lack of independence and conflict of 
interest might play a potentially significant role in defining such decision. However, findings 
suggest that passive institutional shareholders’ were supportive of the work of shareholders 
associations because of the perceived gains from free riding. Third, our study contributes to 
the literature addressing the role of shareholders’ associations in shareholder activism (Johed 
and Catasús, 2015; Strickland et al, 1996; Uche and Atkins, 2015). However, it provides 
different perspective by largely exploring and emphasising the view of institutional 
shareholders. In our case study, we find evidence of the alignment of interest and 
understanding between shareholders’ associations and passive institutional shareholders.   
 
This study have several practical implications. First, the study indicates that the drive for 
corporate accountability through shareholder activism cannot work effectively without 
paying attention to all relevant active actors in an accountability relationship. The case 
findings suggest that the activities of shareholders’ associations have implications for both 
active and passive institutional shareholders. For example, the results show that the work of 
shareholders’ associations has the potential to shape the expected outcome desired by active 
institutional shareholders. Second, our study indicates that shareholders’ associations are not 
only considered to have some influence over management but that they can be seen as subject 
to management influence in shareholder activism. Shareholders’ associations’ co-operation 
with management has been seen as frustrating to the agenda of active institutional 
shareholders. It brings to light the issue of how managerial influence of small shareholder 
groups can impact on the outcomes of meetings between institutional shareholder and 
management. Therefore, in our case setting, there is a need to evaluate how trust and co-
ordination between active institutional shareholders and shareholders associations can be 
restored. This might require re-evaluating how corporate governance systems could be used 
to improve shareholder independence. Poulson et al (2010) reveals that the arrangement of 
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Swedish corporate governance system ensures independence between the board and small 
shareholders. This enables shareholders’ associations independently to influence 
management. 
 
Like all papers, this paper has some limitations. First, the sample was restricted to only one, 
albeit economically important, African country. Caution must be exercised in drawing 
generalisable conclusions. We recognise the benefits of opening this research to multiple 
country perspectives, inculcating significant cultural and legal dimensions. Second, in this 
study we focus solely on examining institutional shareholders’ account of their experiences. 
There is an opportunity for future research to incorporate the views of other market 
participants including management. Third, an ethnographic study may be conducted as part of 
future research. The method is useful in providing deep insight into the process of 
accountability in institutional shareholder activism by capturing activities behind the scenes. 
Lastly, we argue that there is a need to further examine the issue of independence. This has 
been overlooked in normative and empirical studies that assume an independent relationship 
between activists and management (Brav et al, 2008; Johed and Catasús, 2015; Ryan and 
Schneider; 2002; Stratling, 2012).   
 
Notes 
1. Shareholders’ associations are a group of small individual shareholders formed into a 
body of shareholders. The associations requires individuals to officially apply for 
membership status to join the body. 
2. The 2003 Securities and Exchange Commissions’ Code on Corporate Governance (SEC 
Code) also provides for shareholders owning 20% stake to have at least one 
representative on the board 
3. As of the 20th Januay 2016, 1.00 US dollar = 199 Nigerian naira 
4. The National Pension commission officially published its annual reports only up to 2011 
on its website. 
5. One asset company requested anonymity. 
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Table 1. Local Institutional investors’ profiles 
CODES Position Type Status as a financial 
institution 
Approach to shareholder 
activism  
B1 Head of Investment-
Executive Director 
Pensions Bank subsidiary Passive 
B2 Assistant banking Officer Investment 
company 
Bank subsidiary Active 
B3 Managing Director 
Investment banking 
Investment 
company 
Bank subsidiary Active 
B4 Area Business Manager Pensions 
Custodians 
Independent Passive 
B5 Assistant Vice President Pension 
Custodians 
Bank subsidiary Active 
B6 Vice President Investment 
company 
Independent Active 
B7 Research Associate Investment 
company 
Independent Active 
B8 Investment Analyst Investment 
company 
Independent Active 
B9 Head of Operations Investment 
company 
Independent Passive 
B10 Head of Investment Pensions Bank subsidiary Passive 
B11 Fund Manager Pensions Independent Passive 
B12 Chief Operating Officer Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B13 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B14 Group Head Investment Pension Bank subsidiary Passive 
B15 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B16 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B17 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B18 Head Investment  Pension Independent Active 
B19 Fund Manager Investment 
company 
Bank subsidiary Passive 
B20 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Active 
B21 Fund Manager Pensions Bank subsidiary  
B22 Executive Shareholders’ 
Association 
N/A Active 
B23 Head of Investment Investment 
company 
Bank subsidiary Active 
B24 Fund Manager Investment 
company 
Bank subsidiary Passive 
B25 Executive Shareholders’ 
Association 
N/A Active 
B26 Executive Shareholders’ 
Association 
N/A Active 
R1 Representative  Corporate 
Affairs 
Commission 
N/A Not applicable  
R2 Representatives Securities & 
Exchange 
Commission 
N/A Not applicable 
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Table 2 Rank of Pension fund asset (PFA) by Asset Size 
   
PFA rank Q3: 2010 Q4: 2010 Q1: 2011 
Amount 
(N’Million) 
% of 
Total  
Pension  
Assets 
Amount 
(N’Million) 
% of 
Total  
Pension  
Assets 
Amount 
(N’Million) 
% of Total  
Pension  
Assets 
Top 3 399.42 55.63 448.10 54.85 483.64 55.35 
Top 5 504.42 70.26 563.19 68.93 601.92 68.88 
Top 10 664.25 92.52 744.86 91.17 797.02 91.21 
Bottom 3 0.83 0.11 0.91 0.11 0.96 0.11 
Bottom 5 2.00 0.28 2.38 0.29 2.50 0.29 
Bottom 10 14.08 1.96 16.95 2.08 18.70 2.14 
Source: Pencom Annual report, 2011 
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